RUNNING HEAD: The Moro Struggle
in Southern Philippines

The Moro Struggle and the Challenge to Peace-building in Mindanao, Southern Philippines

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Author Note: We would like to acknowledge the partial support provided to Cristina J. Montiel, from an AusAID-ALA visiting research fellowship grant to the Centre for Dialogue at La Trobe University.

[1] GRP-MILF stands for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines – Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Panel for Negotiations.

Abstract

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Southern Philippines involving, principally the Moros, and affecting the Lumad (or Indigenous Peoples) and largely Christian settlers. This is also called the Moro conflict or the Mindanao conflict. We trace the history of the problem across different colonization periods and administrations. In addition, we review the ongoing peace-building initiatives undertaken by the different sectors involved in the region – religious, academic, non-government organizations, people's organizations, and communities. We end this chapter with our own suggestions for peace-building in the region, adopting a multi-dimensional and multi-layered approach to resolving the Mindanao conflict.

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1. Introduction - The Land and Peoples of Mindanao, Philippines

Composed of more than 7,100 islands, the Philippines is home to some 90 million inhabitants. The Philippine archipelago is generally divided into three major island groupings, namely Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Of interest to this discussion is the major island grouping of Mindanao, which is located in the southernmost part of the country. Mindanao is home to a varied mix of people belonging to different ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Blessed with abundant land, water, mineral, and forest resources, the region is considered the source of much of the country's needs. For instance, almost 59% of the country's fish supply is obtained from the waters of Mindanao (Kamlian, 1999). Huge amounts of mineral deposits can also be found in the region. The forests of Mindanao used to serve as an important source of timber for wood products from the early 1960's, until these resources became depleted through massive commercial logging operations.

Over the last three decades, the population of Mindanao has been commonly categorized into three major groupings – *Lumad*, *Moros* or Muslims, and Christians (also called Settlers or Migrants). *Lumad* is a Cebuano Bisayan term which means "indigenous". This was adopted by the Indigenous Peoples themselves because whenever the thirty or so Lumad tribes come together for regional assemblies, Cebuano, the language of Cebu in the Visayas in central Philippines, is their lingua franca. Both Muslim and *Lumad* used to be lumped together as National Cultural

Minorities in Mindanao. The *Lumad* are composed of thirty or more tribes and sub-tribes of the Indigenous Peoples. Consisting of approximately ten percent of the region's population, they have been traditional inhabitants of the greater part of mainland Mindanao, except in Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which continue to be the domain of the *Moros* until today. Starting in 1997, the *Lumad* also began to refer to themselves as Indigenous Peoples, in consonance with the practice of international assemblies like the United Nations, but more particularly, in line with the passage of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 by the Philippine Congress. As a consequence of the resettlement program of the government, both colonial and Philippine, their population has not only been reduced to approximately ten percent of the region's population, they have also become the majority in only eleven municipalities in Mindanao.

Comprising around 20 percent of the population of Mindanao, the *Moros* or *Bangsamoros*, a recently adopted name that is becoming more popular with them, are distributed into 13 ethno-linguistic groups, the greater bulk of whom are traditional inhabitants of Central and Western Mindanao. They are indigenous to Mindanao and became Muslim when Arab traders-missionaries came to the region, married into the local population and spread Islam starting as early as the 14th century, in Tawi-Tawi in the late 14th century, and in Central Mindanao in the early 16th century. They are now the majority in the five provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in Central Mindanao, and Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in Western Mindanao, and also in fifteen other municipalities in adjacent provinces (Census of the Philippines, 2000).

The term *Moro* was originally used by Spaniards for Muslims who occupied the

Iberian Peninsula for nearly 800 years, from 711 to 1492. When the Spanish colonizers discovered there were Muslims in the Philippines, they also called them *Moros*. For many years, the Muslims of Mindanao resented this designation, because it came from Spaniards who waged war on them throughout most of the colonizer's 333 years stay in the Philippines. Spaniards called Mindanao Muslims *"Moro piratas"* because the latter's retaliatory attacks on Christian communities in Spanish-controlled territories had caused so much havoc on colonial interest. We note, however, that Spaniards did not describe their own attacks on Muslims as piracy. It was only in the early 1970's that the name *Moro* became a badge of honor among Mindanao Muslims, after this label, along with Bangsamoro (Moroland), was claimed by the Moro National Liberation Front as the collective identity of Muslims in Mindanao.

The third major category of people includes the largely Christian migrants and their descendants who came from Luzon and Visayas. At present, they constitute the majority population in Mindanao, comprising approximately 79 percent of the population in this region (Census of the Philippines, 2000). Through the resettlement programs of the United States of America colonial government and the new Philippine state, the Christian migrants started to come to Mindanao in droves in 1913. In less than 60 years, these newcomers and their descendants became the majority in most of the provinces in Mindanao. Also included here are the indigenous inhabitants, largely of northern and eastern Mindanao, who were converted into Christianity by the Spanish missionaries. They numbered nearly 200,000 in the 1890's.

In the Philippines, it is in Mindanao that the country has experienced the longest and the most intense political conflicts with both ethnic and religious undertones. In this

chapter, we provide an overview of the Moro struggle in Mindanao - its history, causes and consequences, as well as the peace-building initiatives in the region, along with suggestions for possible resolutions to the conflict.

2. History of the Moro Struggle

A quick review of the history of Mindanao, spanning more than four centuries, will help us comprehend the Moro struggle and its major components, namely, the deep-seated prejudices between Muslims and Christians, the marginalization of the Muslim and *Lumad* communities covering all major aspects of life, the struggle for self-determination fought by the Muslims, and the *Lumad* assertion of their own right to self-governance. Part of the story is the long drawn out peace process that is slowly unfolding and creating new relationships among the peoples of Mindanao.

2.1 *Pre-Islamic and Islamic Mindanao*

We start our review from pre-Islamic Mindanao. We assume for lack of hard data that at this time the various communities in Mindanao existed as autonomous *barangays* or small-clan communities that lived off the land and their natural environment. Travel by sea enabled them to practice limited trade and allowed them cultural interaction. They had their own indigenous faith traditions, a form of animism that revolved around belief in the spirits of the natural world known as *diwata*.

Brought by Arab missionaries-traders who subsequently married into the local population, Islam revolutionized the communities in Mindanao. A gravemarker with Arabic scripts, indicating the year 1380 AD, is the earliest sign of Islamic presence in the province of Tawi-Tawi, in the archipelago of Sulu. There were stories of the early

presence of Muslim missionaries in Maguindanao but Shariff Kabungsuan, one of the earliest Muslim missionaries in Mindanao, is estimated to have arrived at the shores of Maguindanao in the early part of the 16th century. Carrying with it the belief in one God and his Prophet Muhammad and the concepts of political structures that developed in the Middle East from the 7th century, Islam facilitated the shift from an animistic faith tradition to a monotheistic belief system among the recipient communities in the islands. With the new belief also came new laws, ethical standards, political structures, and technologies, such as the Arabic system of speaking and writing. Islam provided the impetus for the establishment of sultanates. Sulu gave birth to the first sultanate in 1450; the Maguindanao sultanate came into existence from the unity of two Maguindanaon principalities in 1619 (Saleeby, 1963; Majul, 1973). Islam also spread as far as Manila, Mindoro and other parts of Luzon and the Visayas but this development was cut short by the arrival of another major social force, Spanish colonialism and Christianity.

Under the auspices of the sultanate system, the Muslim communities were able to accumulate wealth through intensified commercial activities. More importantly perhaps, the sultanates also fostered political, religious, and ideological organization and cohesiveness, thus enabling the Muslim communities to advance ahead of the other inhabitants in the islands. In essence, the Islamization process enabled the Muslim communities to form their own collective identity and to develop a sense of community from which they drew their strength to resist foreign threats to their way of life (Majul, 1973).

2.2 Spanish Colonization

Though the colonization process was initiated by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, Spanish occupation of the Philippine Islands formally started in 1565. Within approximately fifty years, the newcomers - employing the cross, the sword and new technology of warfare like canons as their key weapons of conquest - controled Luzon, Visayas, as well as northern and eastern Mindanao. But even during the first fifty years, Spain already set its eyes on subjugating the Muslims of the two sultanates. What followed were wars that lasted throughout the Spanish colonial presence - 333 years of war, punctuated by occasional peace. To the Spaniards, the wars with the Muslims, now called *Moros*, were *"guerras piraticas"*, or wars against *Moro* pirates. To the Muslims, these were wars of self-defense to protect their political territories and those of their allies. The Spaniards conscripted and utilized thousands of Filipino Christian warriors to fight the Muslims; in return, the Muslims hit Spanish-controlled Filipino communities. The fighting between Christian and Muslim Filipinos thus resulted in deep-seated mutual animosities, distrust and dislike, which have since been carried over from generation to generation and are still felt to this day.

Although the Muslims of Mindanao remained uncolonized in the face of Spanish aggression, they suffered tremendously from the incessant hostilities. As a result of more than 333 years of intermittent Moro-Spanish Wars, the Muslims experienced deteriorating standards of living, poverty and internal discord. Due to the loss in human and natural resources brought about by the wars, the sultanates were unable to promote the growth of the agricultural potential of their lands (Majul, 1973). Furthermore, the power of sultanates deteriorated due to incessant trade blockades and military aggressions from Spanish colonizers and other colonial powers within the Southeast

Asian region, along with in-fighting among the Muslim ruling elite (Majul, 1973; Dery, 1997).

Parallel to the Muslim efforts to halt Spanish colonization, the *Lumad* also resisted missionary attempts to dominate them. Historical records spoke of several *Lumad* acts of resistance against missionary friars who ventured out to Christianize them. These small acts of opposition clearly expressed *Lumad* dislike for foreign interference or subjugation (Rodil, 2003; Schreurs, 1989).

One can sum up the contribution of the Spanish colonization to the development of the conflict in the Mindanao region along three dimensions. First, the colonization of the Luzon and Visayan regions of the Philippines, including northern and eastern Mindanao, led to the formation of a socio-religious collectivity called Christian, which may in turn have led to the development of the Filipino identity. Second, the Spanish divide-and-rule strategy created and sustained feelings of hatred and mistrust between the *Moros* and the Christianized Filipinos (Rodil, 2003). Third, Spanish colonial aggression weakened the Muslim sultanates economically and politically, thereby allowing for the easy conquest of the *Moros* and the occupation of their territory by another colonial aggressor, the US (Majul, 1973; Rodil 2003).

2.3 *American Conquest, Amalgamation and Marginalization*

The American colonizers took over the Philippines from the Spaniards initially through the Treaty of Paris on December 1898 for the price of twenty million dollars and subsequently through armed conquest by separately defeating Filipino and *Moro* resistance. The treaty was the political settlement between the two colonial powers after the United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American war (Tan, 2002; Gowing,

1977). It is important to stress at this point that at the time of the Treaty, the so-called subjects of the treaty were de facto states – the Philippines declared its independence from the Spanish colonizers six months earlier; in Mindanao, the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates and the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranao were never colonized by the Spaniards; the *Lumad*, too, avoided contact with Spain and thus remained free – they were not owned by Spain at the time of the agreement. To this detail in history is traced one of the root causes of the Moro struggle, that the *Moros* were attached to the Philippine state without their plebiscitary consent. The (Christian) Filipinos were never asked either. The agreement was purely a political settlement between two colonial powers. However, any question about the legitimacy of the Paris transaction turned moot and academic after the American victory in war over the Filipinos and *Moros* as well as over the rest of the inhabitants. They all became subjects of US colonialism.

Three aspects of US colonial rule contributed significantly to the Moro struggle: (1) labeling and classification of the population, (2) discriminatory provisions of public land laws, and (3) the resettlement programs. In the census of 1903, the peoples of the Philippine islands were classified into two broad categories – *Christian* and *non-Christian*, which were used interchangeably with *civilized* and *uncivilized*, respectively (Rodil, 1994). The Christians were those converted to Christianity during the Spanish colonial period; the non-Christians were the Moros and the Wild Tribes. These labels were not only utilized in important laws that dealt with the distribution and ownership of land. These same tags also served to justify the creation of special transitory political structures, for instance, like the Moro Province for the Moros, which consisted of the five provincial districts of Davao, Cotabato, Lanao, Zamboanga and Sulu; and Agusan, which consisted of

the present provinces of Bukidnon, Agusan del Norte and Agusan del Sur for the Lumad. The special tag was meant to facilitate their amalgamation into the mainstream Filipino community. Formed in 1903, these were abolished and upgraded after ten years. It is important to contrast these political categories with Christian-dominated Mindanao provinces like Surigao and Misamis, which were designated as regular provinces, as all Christian-dominated provinces in the entire Philippine Islands were classified (Rodil, 1994).

The US colonial government did not only refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the traditional communal system of landownership, land use and distribution, it also introduced and institutionalized the Torrens system of private land ownership, including land classification, registration and titling to private entities. One of its early laws on land declared null and void all land grants made by the traditional leaders of non-Christian tribes without consent of the government. This was followed by public land laws which not only mandated the registration and titling of lands to private persons and corporations, a practice that was alien to the Muslim and *Lumad* peoples, but also pursued a land distribution scheme that was patently discriminatory against the local inhabitants. Three versions of public land laws were implemented in 1903, 1919 and 1936, the latter being an amendment of the previous one. Table 1 shows that individual Christian homesteaders were allowed to own up to 24 hectares of land, while non-Christians could only have 10 hectares at most, which was even reduced to four hectares in 1936; the corporations were allowed 1,024 hectares throughout (Rodil, 1994).

(Insert Table 1 here)

The American colonial government also opened up vast territories of the Philippines to resettlement, including the Cagayan Valley, Mindoro, Palawan and Mindanao. Made to believe that they were moving into and occupying public lands, settlers from the northern and central regions of the Philippines were transported with government assistance to these areas or traveled on their own at their own expense. In Mindanao, the large-scale movement of settlers, also called homesteaders or homeseekers from Luzon and the Visayas started in 1913. By 1970, less than sixty years later, the original local population was brought down to 30 percent while the new migrants increased to 70 percent. This was how the Muslims and the *Lumad* communities were displaced, dispossessed and marginalized in their own ancestral lands. Ironically, the process was government-initiated, largely legal and in accordance with law and state policy (Rodil, 1994).

Two significant aspects of marginalization must be stressed here, governance and compulsory education. The evolution of political structures for non-Christians from special to regular status also indicates a form of marginalization. Within the framework of special provinces, for instance, structures like tribal wards were formed to facilitate assimilation. At first glance they may seem like an American recognition of tribal culture and processes, which they admittedly were. But on closer examination they must also be seen as transition mechanisms meant to hasten integration. They were in effect ultimately designed to sideline, others would prefer to use the word mainstream, indigenous culture and political systems, particularly those involving the two sultanates of Sulu and

Maguindanao.

An added dimension of mainstreaming through governance was the Filipinization of the bureaucracy. By way of preparation for eventual independence, the Jones Law was passed by the US Congress in 1916. Its initial effect on governance was the rapid departure of American personnel from the bureaucracy and their takeover by Filipinos. Its impact on Mindanao, specifically on Moroland, as the Moro Province came to be known, was the increasing appearance of Filipino faces in the bureaucracy. The Moros reacted to this with their demand for the *"Moroization"* of the government within their territories. As an official U.S. government mission was dispatched to the Philippines in the mid-1920's to investigate the preparedness of the people for independence, Moro leaders responded with manifestoes expressing their unwillingness to be part of the Filipino independence and to be governed by Filipinos, and instead declared their preference to remain under the tutelage of America (Rodil, 2003). However, these protests did not prosper. The participation of some of the Moro and *Lumad* leaders in the Constitutional Convention of 1935 "constitutionalized" or sealed the integration process; the *Moros* and the *Lumad* communities were Filipinos and were now part of the forthcoming Republic of the Philippines.

Very early in the colonization process, the American colonial government also introduced compulsory education throughout the Philippine Islands as part of its military strategy. English was the medium of instruction. Public education had the effect of marginalizing local culture. It was designed to produce and it did produce a new generation of Filipinos, *Moros* and *Lumad*, English-speaking and westernized. Its impact on Mindanao was that hundreds of Filipino teachers were dispatched to the region to help

transform the local people into loyal Filipino citizens. Not surprisingly, there were also instances of rebellion from among the *Lumad* and *Moro* populations owing to the unwanted imposition of the compulsory public education program, often misconstrued by Muslims as a systematic attempt to Christianize them (Rodil, 1994).

2.4 *The New Philippine State; Marginalization Continues*

What the American colonial government started, the independent Philippine government continued. As the new Philippine state was formed, the entire machinery of a unitary system of government was put in full force. The land distribution policy and the discriminatory public land laws remained in effect; the resettlement programs also intensified. Compulsory public education remained a tool of cultural integration. In local governance, more and more *Moro* leaders were absorbed into positions of power, both national and local. Those political units earlier tagged as special, were finally allowed by law in the mid-1950's to elect their local officials. At the start, *Moro* and *Lumad* leaders easily won in their traditional territories. But as a consequence of migration, as the arrival of more and more settlers led to numerical dominance, it became more difficult for *Moro* and *Lumad* leaders to win in their own towns. As a result, tension and resentment began to build up.

A quick look at the various censuses (1903, 1918, 1939, 1948, 1960, 1970) will reveal that the weight of population balance tilted in favor of the newcomers after the Second World War and rapidly so until 1970. Nowhere is this most graphically illustrated than in the case of what used to be known as the empire province of Cotabato (now subdivided into the five provinces of Cotabato, South Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani). The territory of Maguindanao was

traditionally the heart of the Maguindanao Sultanate and is presently also the area with the heaviest concentration of Moro Islamic Liberation Front rebels along with the adjacent Lanao provinces. The shifts in population patterns revealed in the censuses of 1918, 1939, 1948 and 1970 tell it all -- the story of displacement and marginalization.

The Maguindanao population, one of the 13 Islamized groups mentioned earlier, in the Cotabato region dipped from 59.51 percent in 1918, to 54.52 percent in 1939, and then plunged to 27.75 percent in 1970; the *Lumad* slipped from 25.04 percent in 1918, to 24.84 in 1939, then fell straight down to 6.68 percent in 1970. The settlers, on the other hand, shot up exponentially from 2.7 percent in 1918, to 24.04 percent in 1939, to 67.19 percent in 1970 (Rodil, 1994).

The fighting between *Moros* and Christians in Central Mindanao can be read as the eruption of the tension brought about by this story of displacement and marginalization. The hostilities could be likened to a prairie fire, raging and burning everything along its path, indiscriminate and lethal. More than 1,000 people died in the year long event, which the media referred to as the Mindanao Crisis of 1971-1972. It became the catalyst that quickened the process toward war in Moroland.

2.5 *The Moro Struggle*

The Moro struggle took the form of a series of violent and non-violent incidents. We have noted earlier that in the mid-1920's up to the mid-1930's, several Moro leaders expressed, in response to the American team investigating the preparedness of Filipinos for independence, that they did not wish to be part of Philippine independence; instead, they preferred to remain under the US. In the 1956 congressional investigation

on the nature of the Moro Problem, various complaints were documented, ranging from failure of governance to loss of land, from loss of identity to *Moro* resistance against integration. This investigation led to the establishment of the Commission on National Integration where those earlier tagged as non-Christians were now formally renamed National Cultural Minorities (Rodil, 1994). In 1961, the congressional representative of the province of Sulu filed a bill to declare the independence of Sulu from the Republic of the Philippines.

In February and March 1968, 26 Muslim trainees from Sulu were massacred by their military trainors, allegedly for mutiny, in the island of Corregidor; other versions said they were merely petitioning for the payment of their allowance which was already delayed by more than a month. This came to be known also as the infamous Jabidah massacre; Jabidah being the code name of the military training that took place in that island. This incident ignited a series of angry rallies from Muslim and non-Muslim activists in both Manila and Mindanao, as well as from opposition politicians and Muslim politicians, one of whom founded the Muslim Independent Movement (MIM) in the summer of 1968. The Jabidah massacre is believed to have fueled the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front. The MIM publicly declared its intention to establish an Islamic State in the predominantly Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu (Gowing, 1979). To open itself to non-Muslim interested parties, it modified its name to Mindanao Independence Movement. As a countermove, Ilonggo settler-politicians, hailing originally from the Island of Panay in the Visayas, and now political leaders in the Cotabato Valley area, formed a paramilitary group which later came to be known as *Ilaga* (rat).

During this time, there were all sorts of political rumors about secret military trainings of Muslim youths in Mindanao and abroad. The year 1971 exploded with a climate of violence among the civilian population, Muslims versus Christians in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Cotabato and Lanao. Christians were associated with *Ilagas* in both provinces. The Muslims in the Cotabato area were associated with the *Blackshirts*, the Muslim provincial security forces who were known for wearing black uniforms, while the Muslims in the Lanao area were associated with the *Barracudas*, another paramilitary group. From January to December 1971, not a single day passed without a violent incident. Several massacres were perpetrated against Muslim communities. One of these was the Tacub Massacre where a group of unarmed Muslim voters were machine-gunned by government troops at a military checkpoint and mutilated by civilian bystanders in Lanao del Norte (Gowing, 1979; Rodil, 1994). Another example was the Manili Massacre, in which Muslim men, women and children who were gathered for a peace conference were slaughtered inside a mosque in the town of Carmen, Cotabato (Rodil, 1994).

Finally, in 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, allegedly for two reasons: (1) the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-led rebellion nationwide, and (2) the Muslim uprising in Mindanao. In late 1972, *Moro* rebels who now called themselves *Bangsamoro*, organized as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). They declared their war of national liberation and their intention to establish the Bangsamoro Republic in the region that they claimed as their ancestral homeland, particularly the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Thus, from 1972 until 1976, war raged in Mindanao. It is estimated that between 100,000 to

120,000 people were killed during the war - fifty percent MNLF, thirty percent military and twenty percent civilians (Rodil, 2000; Rodil, 2003).

3. The Different Meanings of the Moro Conflict

In analyzing the Moro conflict, an important aspect that needs to be accounted for involves the divergences in the meanings of the conflict as a function of group membership and position. To further elaborate, we utilize data from existing research on the conflict.

Using data gathered through interviews with Muslims and Christians in Mindanao, Nuñez (1997) found that members of each group exhibited different perceptions of the causes of the Moro conflict. Muslim respondents cited the government's lack of fairness towards the Muslims as the main cause, while Christian respondents believed that the Mindanao conflict is rooted in the Muslims' desire to control and dominate Mindanao. Similarly, intergroup differences regarding attributions of the Moro conflict were also discovered (Montiel & Macapagal, 2006). Muslim respondents attributed the Moro conflict to structural factors such as the displacement and dispossession of the *Bangsamoro* as well as to the loss of their rights to self-determination. Conversely, Christian respondents attributed the Moro conflict to individual factors such as social and cultural discrimination and corruption of moral mind and fiber. In addition, this research showed that the meanings of the Mindanao conflict can vary as a function of the perceiver's group position, with the low-power Muslim group attributing conflict to structural causes and the high-power Christian group attributing conflict to subjective or person-based origins.

In other researches which emphasized the multiplicity of meanings assigned to the Moro conflict, Inzon (2007) found that the representations of Mindanao leaders in the history of conflict in Mindanao clustered around four main discourses: (1) land possession and dispossession, (2) political resistance and politicization of conflict, (3) armed struggle and non-violent resistance, and (4) a peaceful past vis-à-vis the present conflict. Within each discourse, Christian, *Lumad* and Muslim leaders assigned different meanings and took on different positions regarding the Moro conflict. For example, the history of the Moro conflict based on land possession and dispossession was represented by the Christians according to legal ownership of the land, by the Muslims in terms of historical territorial claims on the land, and by the *Lumad* in terms of tribal claims on the land. What is striking in this research is how Mindanao leaders from different social categories represented the history of the conflict in Mindanao in different and contrasting ways.

These researches demonstrate how the Mindanao conflict can have diverse meanings as a function of group membership. This insight into the multiplicity of social meanings of the Mindanao conflict challenges us to understand the dynamism and contentiousness of the issues at hand.

4. Peace-building Initiatives at the People's Level

Parallel to the history of conflict and war runs a history of peace-building in the Southern Philippine region. From the ashes of war arose a vibrant peace movement that involved the different sectors in society – non-government organizations, people's organizations, communities, academic institutions, and religious sectors. From the

darkness and suffering experienced by the people in Mindanao came a resounding call for peace as evidenced in the various conflict-resolution and peace-building activities undertaken by these sectors. We discuss illustrations of these peace-building activities in the following section.

4.1 *Non-Government Organizations and People's Organizations for Peace*

The pioneers in Mindanao peace-building may have been the private non-government organizations (NGOs) that initiated Muslim-Christian dialogue in the early 1980's. This was the joint effort of the Dansalan Research Center and the Prelature of Marawi. Soon after, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines-Program Aimed at Christian Education about Muslims (PACEM) and the Mindanao Sulu Pastoral Council (MSPC) came up with *Duyog Ramadhan* (Accompanying Ramadhan), which aimed to foster solidarity among people from different religions and cultures, particularly during the holy month of Ramadhan. In 1996, with the positive prospects of a peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front, several NGO's organized the *Kalinaw Mindanaw* peace movement, with assistance from the Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the Catholic Relief Services. *Kalinaw Mindanaw* conducted a series of culture of peace seminars and trainors' training all over Mindanao and Sulu.

More participants came after the signing of the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement. From a modest exposure in 1997, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has not only expanded its operations several fold, it has also partnered with the Philippine government to set up Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme, operating all over Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan and

supporting various private initiatives from communities to academic institutions. Several foreign donors have thrown in substantial funds for their operations. Among them are the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, the European Union, England, Germany, and New Zealand.

Two non-government organizations, Balay Mindanaw in Cagayan de Oro City and the Institute of Autonomy and Governance in Cotabato City, should also be cited for launching peace education for military officers and non-commissioned officers as well as Philippine Marines and Philippine National Police elements, in dialogue with their commanding officers. With the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation and the Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program (AusAid), they have conducted peace education since 2006. As a result, hundreds of officers have already undergone this training. Similarly, the Davao-based Mindanao Peace Institute, although international in character and participation and offered only during the summer months, also admits a limited number of military officers, as part of its effort to create a climate of peace on a global scale.

4.2 *Communities for Peace: Peace Zones*

In Central Mindanao, peace zones stand out in local peace-building not only because they rose out from the midst of war, but especially because the decisions to create zones of peace were made by the community residents themselves. A peace zone is a community that was previously affected by armed conflict, but is now designated by its residents as an area where illegal and violent acts are not allowed and where conflict is resolved in a peaceful manner (LaRousse, 2001; Rodil 2000). The establishment of a peace zone is carried out through negotiations with government and other armed groups,

as supported by representatives from different sectors. Furthermore, the institution of a peace zone necessitates the following requirements: the designation of a specific territory, the formulation of rules, regulations, and conditions for peace zone residents, and the formation of a group of leaders with particular duties and responsibilities (Coronel-Ferrer, 1994).

Located in Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, the Maladeg Peace Zone provides us with an interesting illustration of peace-building at the grassroots level. Inside the Maladeg Peace Zone, armed conflict, gambling, illegal drug use, and other crimes are prohibited. There is a Council of Leaders that facilitates the formulation, dissemination, and implementation of the rules and regulations of the zone. There are also committees assigned to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner, and also to guard against any outburst of conflict in the zone. Furthermore, the Maladeg Peace Zone represents a space where the values, beliefs, and traditions of different groups are duly respected. For instance, both Muslims and Christians are provided with their own spaces where they can practice their own customs and traditions. This is undertaken through the clustering of Muslims on one side of the community and the banding of Christians on another side of the community. While both Christians and Muslims have lived near each other in peace before, certain cultural differences, such as the use of alcoholic beverages and the raising of hogs among Christians, have made it necessary for Muslims and Christians to have their respective spaces for the peaceful practice of their own religions (Rodil, 2000).

Today there are more than 50 communities which are self-sustaining spaces of peace in the Central Mindanao region. These peace zones stand as a testimony to the

power of community peace-building.

4.3 *Peace-building through Academic Institutions*

Several schools, both within and outside Mindanao, are also active in the peace movement. In particular, these schools are involved in research and training on peace, development and the cultural heritage of Mindanao, as well as in social action programs or extension services for Christian, Muslim and Lumad communities.

The Notre Dame University of Cotabato City has pioneered in institutionalizing a peace program in its curriculum, in both undergraduate and graduate levels. This university also has a Peace Education Center, which holds peace training for participants from local government units, non- government organizations, church lay leaders, and youth leaders, using courses and modules on peace and development that the Center has developed (LaRousse, 2001; Rodil 2000). Lately, there is news that the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) plans to produce history and social studies textbooks in primary, intermediate, secondary and collegiate levels that reflect the history of the *Lumad*, the *Moros* and the Christian settlers in Mindanao. The Mindanao State University (MSU) System has established its own Institute of Peace and Development in Mindanao (IPDM) anchored on each of its eleven major campuses in Mindanao and Sulu. The intention is to transform the entire MSU System into a peace university, a goal that was implied in its own charter. Recently, it has integrated peace education in its Civic Welfare Training Service (CWTS) Program, the alternative program for the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and is in the process of integrating peace education in its subject offerings for all degree and diploma programs. Thirty two heads of state colleges and universities in Mindanao also recently came

together for a peace summit in Penang, Malaysia and committed themselves to integrate peace in their respective programs, partly in support of Executive Order 570 which mandates the integration of peace education at all levels of the educational system.

4.4 Interfaith Dialogue and Peace-building

From the original Bishops-*Ulamas* Forum formed in 1996, composed of Catholic and Protestant bishops from Christian churches in Mindanao and Muslim *ulamas* from the *Ulamas* League of the Philippines, this group has now transformed itself into the Bishops-*Ulamas* Conference (BUC), with a commitment to involve itself in peace - building and community development projects. This assembly emphasizes the activation of the faith dimension in the search for peace. From its modest beginnings in 1996, the BUC has inspired its members to put up their own interfaith local organizations in Davao, Cotabato and Zamboanga. As a leading element in inter-religious dialogue in Mindanao, the BUC plays an important role in promoting mutual respect and tolerance among Christians, Muslims and Lumad through discussion groups, training workshops, and celebration activities such as the Mindanao Week of Peace.

Although the Dansalan Research Center-Prelature of Marawi in Lanao del Sur has ceased operating as an institution that offered summer courses on Islam and Mindanao, the Silsilah Dialogue Movement, which specializes in interfaith education and dialogue, has created its own momentum from its base in Zamboanga City (Rodil, 2000). Similarly, the Franciscan Mission in Mindanao has also undertaken its own Franciscan dialogue program in Kidapawan City in Cotabato for the last ten years. This

program, which integrates theory and community exposure on interfaith and intercultural dialogue, is designed for Franciscan priests, brothers, nuns, seminarians and lay workers.

4.5 *Women and Peace in Mindanao*

At this point, allow us to mention that the picture is not complete without the "woman factor". An organization called Mindanao Commission on Women has committed woman-power to the peace and development of Mindanao. Combining the energies of Mindanao women leaders for a few years now, the organization has created an ever-expanding ripple in the people's search for peace.

4.6 *Poverty in Moroland: Prospects for Peace and Self-Reliance*

There is the nagging feeling that things will not be right until a decisive way out of the pervasive state of poverty in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been properly addressed. ARMM is undeniably poor, the poorest region in the country. Since its inception in 1989, nearly 100 percent of its operating budget has been drawn from the Central Government. Its capacity to generate its own funds for governance, least of all for development, has remained unactivated. So, its desire to be politically autonomous is undermined by its own incapacity to finance its own affairs. Indeed, the interface between regional poverty and Manila-centered governance remains a major part of the Moro problem. Certainly, the dual problems of local poverty and political autonomy should be integral to a peace settlement.

5. Suggestions for Peace-building among Peoples in Mindanao

Based on the history of peace-building as well as on the prospects of peace and self-reliance in Mindanao, we now provide suggestions on how we can further build peace in Mindanao. We note two important characteristics of peace-building. First, we argue that peace-building is multi-dimensional. As multi-dimensional, peace-building refers not only to the eradication of armed hostilities between conflicting groups, but also to the creation and maintenance of economic, political and cultural systems that can be deemed as socially just and empowering. Thus, we look at peace-building in consonance with measures undertaken to eliminate the factors that contribute to conflict such as poverty, social injustice, underdevelopment and corruption, as well as programs that promote cultural sensitivity to dispel negative attitudes and stereotypes about particular ethnic groups.

Second, we also argue that peace-building is multi-layered. This means that there exists varying levels of peace-building in the Moro conflict in Mindanao. We propose three levels of peace-building in the Mindanao conflict – micro-level, meso-level and macro-level (Montiel & Christie, 2008).

At the micro-level, we find the person of the individual peace-builder as an integral component to the peace-building in Mindanao. Next to the individual, peace initiatives undertaken by groups, collectivities and movements comprise the meso-level of peace-building. The largest and most inclusive level of peace-building pertains to the macro-level, which includes state, anti-state and global actors. These three levels can be understood as involving different actors, each in constant interaction with the actors in the other levels. Figure 1 summarizes the three levels of peace-building in Muslim Mindanao.

(Insert Figure 1 here)

1.1 *Peace-building at the Micro-Level: The Individual*

With regard to the individual person, peace-building in Muslim Mindanao involves two types of initiatives. First the healing of traumas and internal conflicts among people exposed to violence and duress represents an important component of peace-building. In particular, this healing process involves debriefing and psychological interventions for victims of the war in Mindanao. Second, the cultivation of active non-violence in the interior life and subjective disposition of people in situations of conflict and violence also plays a significant role in the process of building peace in Mindanao.

These two processes are reflected in the Self-Transformation Seminars conducted by teachers from the Mindanao State University – Iligan Institute of Technology (Rodil, 2000). In these seminars, participants engage in activities focused on processing internal and interpersonal conflicts, in view of laying the groundwork for the development of skills in conflict-resolution and conflict-transformation. In particular, starting from the late 1990's, Self-Transformation Seminars, which were initially offered as a three-day module on character-building and inner peace, became the latest component in Culture of Peace seminars given to all military personnel, including officers and rank-and-file soldiers of the First Infantry (Tabak) and Sixth Infantry Divisions, Marines from Sulu, Basilan and Palawan Commands, and Philippine National Police Officers in Western and Eastern Mindanao. Thus, aside from addressing internal conflicts and traumas brought about by the experience of war, the fostering of non-

adversarial and non-violent attitudes and values in individuals also serve as an important foundation for other peace-building initiatives at the different levels.

1.2 *Peace-building at the Meso-Level: The Social Movements*

At the level involving social movements and other collectivities for peace, the challenge of building and strengthening a national movement dedicated towards the achievement of peace in Muslim Mindanao is most apparent. By a national peace movement, we mean a well-informed and empowered citizenry among Christians, Muslims and *Lumad*, not only in Mindanao but also in other parts of the country, most especially in Manila, where political and economic decision-making processes are concentrated. This process of national peace-constituency building can be undertaken through conscientization (consciousness-raising) and democratization processes in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Politically, this necessitates the provision of capacities and opportunities for people's participation in the creation and implementation of peace policies. Thus, education and consultation processes can be undertaken to ensure public interest and involvement in the peace process. With regard to the economic aspect of this process, we identify the need to create and reinforce beliefs and value systems that enable people to become more sensitive to economic inequities that lead to conditions of poverty and deprivation. This involves programs geared towards propagating ideas about land ownership (especially ancestral domains), sharing of common resources and social responsibility. The cultural aspect of building a national peace constituency involves the raising of cultural awareness as well as the promotion of respect and tolerance towards peoples with different histories, religions and cultures. The

importance of this aspect lies in its contribution towards correcting prejudices and disconfirming negative stereotypes and attitudes towards people from different religious and ethnic groups.

Social movements and other collectivities for peace play an important role in this level of peace-building, as they facilitate these consciousness-raising and democratization processes for the general public. In particular, we encourage social movements and other collectivities for peace such as NGOs, POs, schools and parishes to organize public seminars, fora, dialogues and mobilizations in response to issues on peace, development and social justice. Furthermore, social movements and other collectivities for peace are seen to serve as a link between the individual and the structural levels, facilitating an active exchange between the grassroots and the state and global institutions.

Kalinaw Mindanaw represents one example of a social movement for peace in Mindanao. *Kalinaw Mindanaw* is an extensive movement composed of NGOs, POs, schools, parishes, communities and individuals involved in peace-building, peace education and peace advocacy in conflict-affected areas in the region (Evangelista, 2003; Rodil 2000)). Its main aim lies in the propagation of a culture of peace in the region, through modules and seminars on the history of conflict and peace among the Christians, Muslims and *Lumad* in Mindanao. More importantly, these Culture of Peace seminars envision its participants as becoming key agents of peace in their everyday life. Another example of a social movement for peace in Mindanao is the Mindanao Peace Weavers, a convergence of peace advocates from the academic sector, the religious sector, non-government organizations and people's organizations, and

grassroots communities. Its main objectives include the promotion of civil society participation in the Mindanao peace process, the institution of information-sharing and concerted actions among civil society groups regarding issues on Muslim Mindanao peace and conflict, the development of a national peace constituency, and the advancement of a common peace agenda (Mindanao Peaceweavers, n.d).

In addition, the media sector plays a significant role in this process, as the task of mainstreaming discourses on peace in Mindanao falls within their domain. On one hand, the media is challenged to exercise cultural sensitivity in its conduct of reporting about the Muslim and *Lumad* peoples in Mindanao. On the other hand, this role also involves reporting on the conditions of the conflict in Muslim Mindanao, providing constant updates on the peace process and echoing calls for peace and development in the region.

We emphasize that political, economic, and cultural considerations about peace in Mindanao should engage and face the issue of land and territorial ownership in Mindanao. Many peace activities, especially among Christians, do not tackle the issue of land ownership. But land is the primary language of peace propositioned by Muslim peace panels like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

1.3 *Peace-building at the Macro-Level: History of Peace Talks between the Philippine Government and Moro Liberation Fronts*

At the macro-level, peace-building involves state, anti-state and other global entities, such as foreign countries and international organizations involved in the Moro conflict. This section discusses in detail the history of peace talks between the Philippine government and two Moro liberation movements: the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The reason why both government and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) consented to bring themselves to the negotiating table remains unclear to this day. Nevertheless, the two parties decided to enter into peace negotiations through the facilitation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The process started in January 1975 and in December 1976, the two parties signed the Tripoli Agreement in Libya, the document that established the autonomous region for Muslims in Southern Philippines covering 13 provinces. Paragraph 16 of this accord provided further that the entire agreement should be implemented through constitutional processes. It took twenty years before the two could agree on the implementation of the agreement, or on the exact meaning of constitutional processes as stated in Paragraph 16. On September 2, 1996, after four rounds of talks in Jakarta, Indonesia since three years earlier, both the Philippine government and MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement on the Final Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. To this day, however, fourteen years after this signing, the MNLF is still complaining that several provisions of the Final Peace Agreement remain to be implemented. As of this writing, the two parties have had a number of Tripartite meetings, involving the Philippine Government, the MNLF and the OIC, to thresh out precisely how to complete the implementation of the agreement.

Meanwhile, several commanders of the MNLF separated themselves from their organization in the late 1970's and formed themselves into the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. Believing that the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination had been compromised, the MILF leadership refused to accept the terms of the 1996

Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) – Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Final Peace Agreement and decided to resume the struggle. This particular group has been engaged in both war and peaceful negotiation with the Philippine government since 1997. Despite several major wars in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2008-09, both sides have reached major accomplishments in the negotiating table, among them, the general cessation of hostilities which form the basis for the current joint ceasefire mechanism, the Tripoli Agreement on Peace in 2001 which set the three-point agenda technically called: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. As of this writing, only the third, Ancestral Domain, remains to be threshed out. At this point, the most crucial item to be defined is what form of political self-determination for the *Bangsamoro* will be arrived at, somewhere between the present autonomy and independence.

An agreement was already reached in July 2008 when the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front initialed the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) and scheduled the signing on August 5, 2008. However, opposition politicians brought the matter to the Supreme Court, which in turn issued an order to abort the signing and nearly three months later declared the document unconstitutional. Even before the Court could issue its ruling, Malacañang disbanded the government peace panel and issued a statement that the Philippine government would not sign the MOA-AD in its present form or in any other form, regardless of Supreme Court decision. This was met with violent attacks on civilian communities in Central Mindanao allegedly led by three MILF commanders. The Philippine government reacted with a military campaign, although it publicly stated that this was not against the entire MILF

organization, only against the three commanders. In the next ten months, the fighting displaced more than half a million inhabitants. A new government panel was formed, orders for cessation of hostilities were issued by both sides, and negotiation was resumed. But until the end of the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in June 2010, the two parties could not reach any substantive agreement. What was signed on June 3, 2010 was technically called a *Declaration of Continuity.* Nevertheless, there is still some consolation that can be derived from this declaration, such as the revival of the joint ceasefire mechanism which assured real cessation of hostilities, the renewal of an expanded International Monitoring Team which was given new Terms of Reference, and the creation of an International Contact Group (Rodil, 2010b).

Recently, the present government of Philippine President Benigno Aquino III designated Mr. Marvic Leonen, a lawyer and dean of the Law School of the University of the Philippines, as chair of the new government peace negotiating panel. As of this writing, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which had earlier deactivated its panel, has yet to form a new negotiating team.

The public reaction to the MOA-AD varied and ranged from total acceptance to absolute rejection. Many Muslims, especially those in Central Mindanao (MILF territory), embraced the agreement. Other Muslims in Western Mindanao (MNLF territory) stood lukewarm. The Christian population, particularly in those locations that were listed within the ancestral domain claims of the Bangsamoro, were generally vehemently against the peace agreement. The *Lumad* communities were also generally opposed to this agreement, especially to the inclusion of their own ancestral domains within the claimed *Moro* ancestral domain (Rodil, 2010).

Angry Christian-led rallies were held simultaneously in Zamboanga City, Kidapawan City in the Cotabato province, and Iligan City. Note that these reactions surfaced even before the relevant official documents on the MOA-AD were released to the public, indicating that what were being expressed in these protests were previously stored and accumulated sentiments that were already in existence prior to the MOA-AD. These were expressions of opposition to imagined realities and fears rather than to the actual content of the document. Such vehement reactions were also exhibited in 1996, in reaction to the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), the transitory mechanism that formed part of the Final Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front. A similar manifestation also occurred in 1988-1989 over the issue of the name Muslim Mindanao (Rodil, 2010).

Organized Lumad groups held their own assemblies to express their collective sentiments in reaction to the MOA-AD. While they acknowledge the legitimacy of the *Bangsamoro* struggle for self-determination, the *Lumad* asserted that they are not *Bangsamoro*; they also have their own right to self-determination and are asserting their right to self-governance. Among the various *Lumad* groups, only the Teduray agree to their inclusion in the territory of the MOA-AD. Their situation is simple and beyond dispute. They are already physically located within the *Bangsamoro* ancestral domain, particularly in Maguindanao territory, deep within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and cannot but be part of *Bangsamoro* ancestral domain. Nevertheless, they would like their being Teduray and their own ancestral domain to be recognized and respected as distinctly their own. This was allegedly contained in a pact which their ancestors, Mamalu and Tabunaway, agreed upon in the past. For both

Teduray and Maguindanao, brothers Mamalu and Tabunaway were their ancestors. Thus, they would like to negotiate for an arrangement of an autonomy within an autonomy (Rodil, 2010).

Reducing the political choice to a bipolar decision by majority-voting about ancestral land in Mindanao may muffle the minority voices of Muslims and Lumad.Looking at the numbers angle, the *Lumad* population is only approximately ten percent all over Mindanao; the *Moro* population is estimated at around twenty percent; and seventy percent is composed of Christian settlers and their descendants. As such, even if the first two are combined, they will not win in a referendum over the issue of ancestral domain. Yet the ancestral domain issue is seen by Muslims and Lumad as a natural historic right as fundamental as one's right to life.

A two-track forked solution may deal distinctively with Muslims and Lumad claims. On the one hand, there should be formal peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and at the same time, the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front should be pursued. In the process, the necessity of revising the constitution in order to find a permanent solution to the Moro conflict should be taken into consideration. On the other hand, the Philippine Government, particularly the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), must see to it that the processing of *Lumad* ancestral domain claims are completed at the shortest possible time, independently of the GRP-MILF peace process. This is the *Lumad's* guarantee that their domains will remain intact regardless of political restructuring. Active dialogues must be undertaken at the local level by local government units among the *Lumad*, *Moro* and Christian settler populations to create a

climate of mutual recognition of each other's concerns. They themselves will create the guarantee that they can live with each other in peace in their respective communities (Rodil, 2010).

1.4 *Peace-building at the Macro-Level: Toward a Federal Political Structure; Anti-poverty Socio-economic Reforms*

With regard to political reforms and restructuring, we propose transitioning from a unitary political system to a federal structure of government. A federal structure will provide us with mechanisms to the following conditions for peace in Mindanao: (1) the devolution of powers from Manila to the regions, (2) the creation of a more responsive system for addressing the economic, political and cultural needs of the people, (3) the promotion of identity based on different histories, religions and cultures, and (4) the strengthening of people's initiatives for self-rule and self-development. Thus, we argue for the possibility of addressing the economic, political and cultural roots of the Moro conflict through the institution of a federal form of government.

Furthermore, we also set forth the following suggestions in exploring federalism for the Philippines. First, we need to review our previous attempts in instituting local autonomy and consider the triumphs and challenges that these experiences have brought about. What were the lessons learned from our experience with the ARMM? What were the roadblocks encountered by the MOA-AD? Second, we need to ensure that the calls for federalization emanate from an empowered Christian, Muslim and *Lumad* constituency. The process of transitioning to a federal structure of government not only involves legislation concerning territorial claims and local government structure,

but also community dialogues as a procedural requirement. The nature of this community dialogues will involve various types of discussion – workshops on intra and intergroup levels, with Christians, Muslims and *Lumad* carrying out grassroots discussions within their respective groups and between these three groups. At the heart of this transition process lies an empowered constituency claiming and advocating for their own autonomy. Thus, we need to make sure that capabilities and opportunities for cultural and political participation in the transition process are provided for the people in the regions. In this way, we hope to employ federalism as a potent tool for peace-building in Muslim Mindanao.

On a related note, we also argue for socio-economic reforms as an important step towards peace-building. In addition to rehabilitation plans for areas destroyed by war, these socio-economic reforms also include programs on agrarian reform, poverty alleviation and environmental protection of forests and mineral deposits.

Table 2 summarizes peace-building activities in these three levels. As mentioned earlier, peace-building within the various layers is not static, but rather, is engaged in continuous interaction with peace-building in the other layers. Thus, our struggle for peace should move us to continuously engage in peace-building across these different layers, in our hope of achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for the different peoples of Muslim Mindanao.

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

Figure 1. Levels of peace-building in Mindanao, Southern Philippines

Table 1

Land Provisions under Public Land Law and Resettlement

	Number of Hectares Allowed for Ownership		
Year	Christians Homesteaders	Non-Christians (Moros and Wild Tribes)	Corporations
1903	16 has.	(no provision)	1,024 has.
1919	24 has.	10 has.	1,024 has.
1936	16 has.	4 has.	1,024 has.

Table 2

Summary of peace-building suggestions for Mindanao across three layers

Level of Peace-buildingPeace-building	Suggestions
Micro-level: Individuals in conflict and violence situations	Healing of traumas and internal conflicts
	Cultivation of active non-violence in interior life and subjective disposition of individuals
Meso-level: Social movements and other collectivities for peace	Conscientization and democratization processes in political, economic and cultural spheres
	Peace conversations about land ownership in Mindanao
Macro-level: State, anti-state and global actors	Political restructuring: Genuine federalism with community dialogues as a procedural requirement
	Socio-economic reforms: Poverty-alleviation, development and environmental protection
	Peace agreements between the Philippine government, Lumad and Moro Fronts